… la science ne connaît pas un seul “fait brut” …. les “faits” qui entrent dans nos connaissances sont déjà considérés sous un certain angle, et sont, par conséquent, essentiellement spéculatifs. (p. 15)
Feyerabend, P. (1979). Contre la méthode : esquisse d’une théorie anarchiste de la connaissance. Paris : Seuil.
Voir aussi Danziger (1990), Hanson (1958/2010), Popper (1963/2006), Searle (1995).
Any system of classification or individuation of objects, any set of categories for describing the world, indeed, any system of representation at all is conventional, and to that extent arbitrary. (p. 160)
Searle, J. R. (1995). The construction of social reality. New York: The Free Press.
Voir aussi Danziger (1990), Feyerabend (1979), Hanson (1958/2010), Popper (1963/2006).
But in truth scientific psychology does not deal in natural objects. It deals in test scores, rating scales, response distributions, serial lists, and innumerable other items that the investigator does not find but constructs with great care. Whatever guesses are made about the natural world are totally constrained by this world of artifacts. (p. 2)
Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Voir aussi Feyerabend (1979), Hanson (1958/2010), Popper (2006), Searle (1995).
